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Abstract: 
 
This paper examines investment behavior and the effects of financing constraints among Korean 
manufacturing companies before and after the 1997 financial crisis using a firm-level panel data. I 
estimate the Q and sales accelerator models considering the possibility of cash constraint of investment by 
categorizing firms based on their age, size and affiliations to the Korean industrial conglomerates (i.e., 
chaebols). The results indicate that Q becomes a key determinant of investment decision while the sales 
variable becomes less important after the crisis began. Q remains to be important for bigger and more 
mature firms even after the 1997 crisis and becomes significant to smaller and relatively younger ones. It 
suggests that there could have been a shift from the quantity (sales) to the quality (Q) as the key 
component of firm’s investment. The effect of cash balance becomes statistically and economically 
significant in the post-crisis period reflecting increase in financial stress among corporations. Moreover, 
firms’ financing constraints, as measured by their cash balances, turn out to be more binding among 
financially “weaker” groups such as younger or smaller firms. While these results are consistent with the 
predictions of the “pecking order” theory of corporate financing, I also find, somewhat surprisingly, that 
the effects of cash on investment demand are stronger for chaebol-affiliated firms than for non-affiliates. 
This suggests that government regulation of chaebol companies may need to be reconsidered because they 
also face binding finance constraints and no longer have a large advantage in financing their business 
projects. 
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1. Introduction 
A financial crisis is an unfortunate event for any economy. It is likely to increase the cost 
of capital and eventually hurt the growth potential of the country. Given that they do occur, 
however, these crises also provide researchers with opportunities to observe their causes and 
effects. Among these, the role of credit crunches has been particular interest. For example, there 
could be some financially weaker firms suffering from credit rationing due to conventional 
problems of asymmetric information. And yet, one may be unable to detect such underlying 
factors when the economic situation is good because they tend to be hidden in the overall flow of 
funds. A financial crisis may amplify this type of credit intermediation problem and create 
sufficient variation to test empirically the hypothesis of whether credit conditions have 
heterogeneous effects on firms with different characteristics. This paper investigates what 
happened in Korea’s corporate sector in the wake of the 1997 financial crisis by testing for the 
existence of cash constraints after controlling for the conventional determinants of a firm’s 
investment decision such as its Tobin’s Q and sales. Also, the paper studies the changes in firms’ 
investment behavior by considering the pre- and post-crisis periods separately. 
The Korean economy experienced its first financial crisis in 1997. The crisis caused 
distress in both the financial and corporate sectors. Since then, Korean corporations have been 
required by law to maintain ratios of debt to equity below 200 percent.1 Financial institutions 
have also needed to keep up with new regulations such as the Basle standards and to be more 
diligent in finding profitable projects for their funds. For firms, a key policy question is whether 
the resulting contraction of credit raised the costs of external funding for some classes of 
borrowers and forced them to forgo investment opportunities due to inadequate internal liquidity. 
                                                 
1 While a debt to equity of 200 percent may appear large for an exchange-listed firm, the average level on 
the eve of the crisis among listed manufacturing firms was 329 percent! By 2001, the average had fallen 
to 119 percent. See Table A1 in the Appendix A. 
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Indeed, the financial crisis offers an opportunity to observe changes in the severity of firms’ 
financing constraints because they tend to be less binding when economic conditions are good 
(see Hubbard, 1998). In addition to that, it may also be useful for evaluating how effective an 
IMF program was in reviving and maintaining a well-functioning financial system in a crisis 
situation. The specific program that was initiated after the crisis called for reforms in the Korean 
financial and corporate sectors. 
Before the crisis, the Korean government exerted some control over the flow of funds 
from financial intermediaries to firms. From the beginning of the nation’s modern economic 
development, the government held the power to channel funds to specific sectors through direct 
controls over the economic and managerial activities of financial intermediaries. Until the end of 
the 1980s, the beneficiaries had for the most part been large and well-established corporations in 
industries that required large fixed investments. As the government shifted its concern in the 
early 1990s from economic growth to the structure of the economy, and specifically to adjusting 
imbalances that had been created across industries by earlier interventions, it began to direct 
funds to less well-established firms of small and medium-size through policy loan programs and 
the regulation of interest rates.2 The result was a more balanced allocation of loanable funds 
across the distributions of firm ages and sizes, but perhaps also a tendency to lend to firms for 
which there was less reliable information about the quality of their business plans. 
This paper examines what happened in this lending climate after the crisis struck in 
December 1997 and it became apparent that the government’s policy change had led to many 
delinquent or defaulting loans. The evidence suggests that Korean banks, in response to the 
contraction of credit that immediately followed the crisis, began to screen potential applicants 
more intensely based on market criteria rather than policy objectives, and that as foreign capital 
                                                 
2 See Dekle and Kletzer (2001) and Laeven (2002) for further discussion. 
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began to flow back into the country by late 1998, this new market orientation strengthened. In 
other words, the tradeoff between a firm’s future expected profitability, as measured by Tobin’s 
Q and perhaps the volatility of this profitability, become a much stronger force in the credit 
allocation process. 
The empirical evidence is based on an analysis of 418 Korean manufacturing firms over 
the 10 years surrounding the 1997 financial crisis (1992-2001).  As in earlier studies of the 
United States and Japan (e.g., Fazarri, Hubbard and Petersen, 1988; Hayashi and Inoue, 1991), I 
consider firm level-investment decisions with Tobin’s Q, the stock of cash, cash flow, and the 
level of sales entering as possible determinants in the neoclassical and sales accelerator 
frameworks. To implement the idea of financial hierarchy or “pecking order”, firms are 
classified by their age, size, and whether they are affiliated with large Korean industrial 
conglomerates, or “chaebols”. The priors would suggest that younger and smaller firms would be 
less well-established and thus more constrained financially in terms of the availability of external 
funding opportunities than older, larger, and more established ones. Chaebol-affiliated firms, 
before the crisis, enjoyed preferential access to funding and thus might be expected to be less 
financially constrained than non-affiliates. The models are estimated using the generalized 
methods of moments (GMM) estimator developed for the analysis of panel data by Arellano and 
Bond (1991). The GMM method has been chosen among other possible dynamic panel 
estimators because it is well-suited for the considerable breadth yet relatively short time 
dimension of our panel (see Judson and Owen, 1999). 
The main findings indicate that the nature of financial constraints changed across classes 
of Korean manufacturing firms importantly after the crisis. In particular, the level of cash 
balances, cash flow, and sales became less important for younger and smaller firms after the 
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crisis, whereas the quality of investment opportunities, as proxied by Tobin’s Q, became a 
critical determinant of investment despite its lack of explanatory power beforehand. For older 
and bigger firms, Q was a strong determinant of investment before and after the crisis, but cash 
and sales became less important afterwards. This suggests that lenders are now screening more 
thoroughly over corporations’ projects when they apply for funding rather than by simply 
checking their sizes or reputations. This paper also finds chaebol-affiliated firms becoming more 
financially constrained after the crisis, with their cash positions and sales becoming all the more 
important. The evidence suggests that a loss of preferential access to credit, to which the 
government-imposed ceiling on the debt to equity ratios played a particularly potent role for the 
well-connected conglomerates, combined with a traditionally low risk, low return tradeoff to 
render chaebols less well suited to lender tastes in the more competitive banking climate that 
emerged after the crisis. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I summarize the theoretical 
underpinnings of the analysis and introduce the empirical specifications that will be estimated. 
Section 3 describes the firm-level panel data set and the classification system that will be used. 
Section 4 presents the estimation results from the panel GMM models with three different firm 
classifications. To check the robustness of my classifications, in section 5, I re-estimate the sub-
samples by firms’ age and size excluding chaebol –affiliated firms. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Methodology 
Conventional models of the firm-level demand for investment emphasize expected profits 
and the cost of capital as important determinants. The standard Q-theory summarizes the 
neoclassical view by holding that Q, defined as the ratio of the market valuation of a firm to the 
replacement value of its assets, is a sufficient explanatory factor for investment demand.  Other 
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frameworks move beyond the frictionless economy and representative firm assumed by the 
neoclassical model to address the role of capital market imperfections, and particularly those 
deriving from informational asymmetries.3  Among these is  Fazarri, Hubbard and Petersen (FHP, 
1988), which introduces a modified version of the financial hierarchy model of Myers and 
Majluf (1984) that implies a “pecking order” starting with low-cost funding sources, such as 
retained earnings, and proceeding to higher-cost ones such as bank loans and new share issues.4  
Since internal and external financing are no longer perfect substitutes, firms do not issue shares 
unless the marginal Q for their new projects is sufficiently high. Thus, the financial structure of a 
firm is not as independent of its investment decision as Modigliani and Miller (1958) would 
suggest. 
Following FHP, a vast empirical literature emerged to investigate these questions further. 
Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991), using panel data from 145 Japanese manufacturing firms 
for the period from 1977 to 1982, find that liquidity is more important to independent firms than 
to those with strong ties to major banks.  Hayashi and Inoue (1991) studied 687 manufacturing 
firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange for the period from 1977 to 1986.  After classifying 
firms into two categories, light industry and heavy industry, they found that the significance of 
cash flow for investment disappeared among firms in heavy industry from 1984 to 1986, which 
coincided with the period after Japan liberalized its capital markets. Similarly, Gallego and 
Loayza (2001), in a study of 79 listed Chilean companies from 1985 to 1995, conclude that 
investment became more responsive to Q and less tied to cash flow and debt in the 1990s, which 
is the period following the second wave of its financial liberalization. For the Korean 
                                                 
3 For example, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) find that equilibrium credit rationing can arise in loan markets 
with adverse selection caused by asymmetric information.    
 
4 FHP describe the sources of this cost differential, which include transaction costs, tax advantages, 
agency problems, and distortions associated with financial distress. 
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manufacturing sector, Park and Shin (1998) classified 629 firms by affiliation to a chaebol from 
1990 to 1995 (i.e., before the crisis), and found that chaebol-affiliated firms were less 
constrained by internal funds than non-chaebol firms. Interestingly, Borensztein and Lee (2002) 
find that a firm’s profit in the previous year became a key factor for procuring credit from 
financial intermediaries after the crisis, and that chaebol firms seem to have lost their preferential 
access to bank lending. 
In this analysis, I start with a dynamic panel version of Hayashi’s (1982) specification as 
a baseline.5  This model is consistent with the Q-theory of investment under a linear and 
homogeneous profit function and an efficient stock market. The specification is 
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where I/K is the ratio of firm i’s investment in year t to its capital stock, with the latter measured 
at the beginning of the period, Q is Tobin’s Q, also measured at the beginning of the period, the 
tΦ  are dummy variables for years, and the iη  are firm-specific fixed effects. 
Since the neoclassical model implies that Q is sufficient for explaining firm investment, 
adding other explanatory variables such as cash balances or sales should not significantly affect 
the regression if the model is correct.  To test this, I estimate two variants of equation (1).  First, 
cash balances and cash flows are added to the benchmark equation to test for the presence of 
financing constraints as follows: 
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5 Hayashi (1982) estimated the time series version of equation (1) using aggregates from 1952 to 1978 as 
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where C/K is firm i’s cash balance at the beginning of period t and CF/K is firm i’s cash flow 
over period t relative to its capital stock at the beginning of the period. 
Next, I add the current level of sales to examine whether the investment decisions of 
Korean firms conform to a simple acceleration principle6: 
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where S/K is the ratio of firm i’s sales in period t to the beginning-of-period capital stock.  
Following Arellano and Bond (1991), we can eliminate the firm-specific effect by 
differencing equation (1): 
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Because the (t-1) component of the error term is potentially correlated with (t-1) component of 
the differenced lag of the investment rate, OLS estimation may produce biased coefficient 
estimates for all of the right-hand side variables when, as is the case here, the time dimension of 
the panel is small. For this reason, I instrument for the difference of the lagged investment rate 
using its lag levels in t-2 and t-3, thus implementing Arellano and Bond’s GMM estimator. 
                                                 
6 Abel and Blanchard (1986) describe three possible sources of a sales accelerator. First, a firm is more 
likely to choose its current level of investment using forecasts of future sales that are based upon current 
and past sales.  Second, both delivery lags on investment goods and the adjustment costs of putting them 
in place will make firms either unable or unwilling to adjust their capital stocks immediately in response 
to changes in current sales. Finally, an order made in the current period may not appear as an investment 
expenditure on a firm’s financial statements until some time later. 
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When adding cash and/or sales to the baseline model as in (2) and (5), I also take first 
differences and estimate with GMM: 
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3. Data Description and Firm Classifications 
The primary sources of firm-level data are the annual members’ reports published by the 
Korea Listed Companies Association (KLCA). These data are available in electronic format for 
1997-2001, and were collected from the print version of the 1997 KLCA yearbook for 1992-
1996. The reports include information from balance sheets, income statements, and statements 
on distributions and cash flows for all firms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange (KSE), which 
listed 686 companies in 2001. The attention will be limited to exchange-listed firms in the 
manufacturing sector because of the greater credibility and consistency of the financial 
statements of listed firms than unlisted ones and the relatively smooth investment schedules of 
manufacturing firms compared to other sectors such as construction or service (see Hayashi and 
Inoue, 1991).7 This gives us 418 firms with continuous observations for the ten years 
surrounding the crisis.8 
                                                 
7 Those firms listed on the Korea Securities Dealers’ Automated Quotation System (KOSDAQ) are 
excluded for two reasons. First, KOSDAQ was officially established in 1996, one year before the 
financial crisis. Since the objective is to explore changes in the severity of financing constraints before 
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I construct a proxy for Tobin’s Q as the ratio of market to book values of a firm’s 
financial obligations.9  In general, the true marginal Q as it appears in standard Q-theory is not 
observable, but rather investigators must be satisfied with the average Q as reflected in market 
prices.10  Net cash flow is measured as the difference between the starting and ending cash 
balances over the calendar year. Similarly, net investment is measured as the difference between 
the starting and ending capital stocks (i.e., not adjusted for depreciation).11 When used as 
explanatory variables, cash balances are measured at the start of the year and sales reflects gross 
receipts over the course of the year. I also include several dummy variables in all of the 
specifications but do not report them in the tables that follow. These are dummy variables for 
time and for years when a firm shows net losses on its income statement or has a negative cash 
flow. Even though these indicators turn out to be statistically insignificant nearly all of the time, I 
believe that it is important to control for them since the investment decision is likely to be 
affected critically for firms suffering losses or severe problems with cash flow. 
To explore the effects of firm heterogeneity in the sample, I classify firms on three 
different dimensions. The first two are in the spirit of FHP, who classified firms according to 
                                                                                                                                                             
and after the 1997 crisis, I prefer to use the same group of firms across the pre- and post-crisis periods. 
Second, most of the KOSDAQ-listed firms started up after the financial crisis and often as a result of 
government policies aimed at promoting small businesses. 
 
8 Like FHP, I limit the analysis to manufacturing firms that survived over the full sample period. This 
comes at some cost in terms of sampling bias due to the financial crisis, which caused many firms to end 
their operations. 
 
9 In particular, the numerator of Q is the sum of the market value of a firm’s common stock (i.e., share 
price multiplied by number of shares) and its short and long-term liabilities. The denominator is the sum 
of the book value of a firm’s common stock (i.e., shareholders’ equity less intangible assets) and its short 
and long-term liabilities. (see Appendix B.) 
 
10 Hayashi (1982) showed that average Q coincides with marginal Q for a price-taking firm with constant 
returns to scale in both the production and the installation functions. 
 
11 The capital stock includes land as well as other property and equipment. I include land because it is a 
scarce and especially important input in Korea. (see Appendix B.) 
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their retention practices. I choose to classify firms by their maturity rather than their dividend 
policies, however, because the stable dividend policies of the types of US firms included in the 
Value Line database allowed FHP to associate the group with the lowest dividend payouts with 
firms most likely to be faced with problems of asymmetric information.  Firms in emerging 
markets, however, generally have less stable dividend payments than their US counterparts, and 
fluctuations in these payments are more likely to reflect fluctuations in industry fundamentals 
than informational problems.12 More specifically, I classify firms by dividing the sample into 
two groups based on the median of the sample age distribution. It turned out that “young” firms 
(i.e., younger than the median firm) were those that listed on the KSE on or after August 1, 1987, 
while “old” firms were those that listed before August 1987. I suspect that classifying firms by 
age may capture the concept of financial “weakness” for emerging market firms more clearly 
than FHP’s payout classification because young firms are less well established and therefore less 
well known to potential investors than older ones, making them potentially more constrained 
financially. 
 Using the same general reasoning, I also classify firms by their size, with small firms 
being presumably more cash constrained than larger ones. Small firms are defined as those with 
total assets below the sample median. The final classification is based on whether or not a firm is 
affiliated with a Korean industrial conglomerate or chaebol.13 I obtained a list of chaebol firms 
from the annual announcements of the Korean Fair Trade Commission (FTC).  The FTC updates 
                                                 
12 Using companies in eight emerging market markets over the period from 1980 to 1990, Aivazian, 
Booth and Cleary (2003) find that it is more difficult to predict dividend changes for companies in a 
number of emerging markets than for a sample of 100 U.S. companies. 
13 Park and Shin (1998), Laeven (2002) and Borensztein and Lee (2002) also consider financing 
constraints among chaebol and non-chaebol firms. Similarly, Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991) 
consider financing constraints among Japanese firms that are members of a “keiretsu” (i.e., a Japanese 
industrial conglomerate). 
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their ranking of the top 30 chaebol-firms annually, listing them by size. Table A2 in the 
Appendix includes cross tabulations of firms in the sample by age, size and chaebol affiliation. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
This section begins by estimating the baseline equations (1) to (5) for the full panel of 
418 manufacturing firms over the period from 1992 to 2001. Next, I divide the panel into two 
periods, covering the pre-crisis (1992-1996) and post-crisis (1997-2001) years, and compare the 
results with those obtained from the baseline and under the three different classification schemes 
(i.e., age, size, and chaebol affiliation). This allows us to evaluate changes that may have 
occurred in the relative importance of various determinants of firm level investment after the 
crisis. 
 
4.1. Investment decision for the pooled sample 
Table 1 reports the pooled regression results for equations (1) to (5) for 1992-2001. In the 
first column the coefficient on Q is positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent level 
when it enters the specification alone, which is consistent with standard Q-theory. Adding cash 
balances to the specification (equation 2) yields statistically significant coefficients for both cash 
balances and Q, suggesting that constraints on internal financing may also have played a role in 
firm-level investment decisions. The third column (equation 3) indicates that the cash balances at 
the beginning of a year and cash flow over that year are both statistically significant when 
entered into the investment equation together. The last two columns add the ratio of current sales 
to the capital stock to the specification in a “sales accelerator” formulation. In equation 4, Q and 
cash balances remain statistically significant at the 5 percent level and the coefficient on sales  
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Table 1 
Investment GMM regressions with pooled sample, 1992 – 2001 
Equation No. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
I/Kt-1 0.052** 0.048** 0.047** 0.050** 0.051** 
 (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) 
Q 0.158** 0.162** 0.153** 0.123** 0.123** 
 (0.055) (0.057) (0.056) (0.047) (0.048) 
C/K  0.139* 0.214** 0.188** 0.154* 
  (0.077) (0.063) (0.063) (0.081) 
CF/K   0.134**  -0.071 
   (0.033)  (0.071) 
S/K    0.057* 0.063** 
    (0.033) (0.029) 
Hansen 0.465 0.271 0.249 0.238 0.236 
N 2,837 2,833 2,833 2,833 2,833 
 
The table reports one-step GMM results for equations (1) to (5) as described in Section 2 of the text. The 
dependent variable is the ratio of investment expenditures to the capital stock. T-statistics based on robust 
standard errors appear in parentheses beneath the coefficient estimates. The last two rows report the p-
value for the Hansen test of the over-identifying restrictions and the number of observations. * and ** 
denote statistical significance at the 10 and 5 percent levels respectively. 
 
 
Table 2 
Investment GMM regressions with pooled sample, pre and post-crisis  
Equation No. (1) (2) (4) (1) (2) (4) 
 pre-crisis period (1992-1996) post-crisis period (1997-2001) 
I/Kt-1 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.056* 0.053* 0.053* 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.032) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) 
Q 0.393** 0.390** 0.249 0.141** 0.145** 0.115** 
 (0.186) (0.182) (0.158) (0.051) (0.053) (0.044) 
C/K  0.415** 0.093  0.105* 0.152** 
  (0.130) (0.137)  (0.064) (0.063) 
S/K   0.221**   0.043* 
   (0.050)   (0.026) 
Hansen 0.412 0.286 0.307 0.382 0.254 0.211 
N 763 763 763 2,074 2,070 2,070 
 
See notes for Table 1. 
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itself is positive and significant at the 10 percent level. When cash flows are added in equation 5, 
however, it does not have a significant coefficient. This may reflect collinearity between sales 
and the two cash variables, as suggested by their high correlations.14  Hansen tests do not reject 
the over-identifying restrictions imposed by the instrument set in any of the specifications.15  
Table 2 considers the periods before and after the financial crisis separately. The results 
are in many respects similar to those obtained over the full sample period, but there are subtle 
differences. For example, Q remains statistically significant at the 5 percent level except in the 
regression that includes sales in the pre-crisis period (equation 4), and the size of the coefficient 
on sales is much larger in the pre-crisis period than after the crisis. Measured at the sample 
means of S/K, the elasticity of the investment rate with respect to sales is about 0.10 in the pre-
crisis period and 0.01 in the post-crisis period (i.e., a one percent change in S/K is associated 
with about a 0.1 percent change in the investment rate before the crisis and 0.01 percent change 
afterwards). This suggests that the sales accelerator was potentially quite strong in the pre-crisis 
period but weakened later. Also notable is that the coefficients on Q (and the implied elasticities 
of investment) are smaller and the coefficients on lagged investment are larger for 1997 – 2001, 
suggesting greater persistence in the investment decision after the crisis. 
Overall, the similarities across the two periods seem to outweigh the differences. It would 
not be appropriate to conclude, however, that the patterns of corporate financing were unaffected 
                                                 
14 The correlation coefficient in the sample of sales with cash balances is 0.43, and that of sales and cash 
flows is 0.52.  Since the stock of cash also seems to perform better than cash flow in the investment 
regressions when each enters the specification alone, I decide to limit the presentation in the subsequent 
tables to equations (1) – (4). This also reflects the intuition behind Blinder’s (1988) comment on FHP, 
which suggests that liquidity constraints should pertain to stocks of potential resources rather than flows. 
For example, a low current cash flow may not constrain acquisitions of capital for a firm with a large 
accumulated stock of cash. 
 
15 The test for higher order serial correlation proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) also supports the 
specification. Also, the hypothesis of higher order serial correlation in all the specifications that follow 
are rejected. 
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by the crisis. Indeed, I will show next that the pooling of data in Tables 1 and 2 masks important 
effects of the crisis on certain classes of firms. 
 
4.2. Investment by age 
Table 3 shows estimation results when I classify firms by their maturity. I define a firm 
as “young” if it listed on the KSE after August 1987, which corresponds to the median age of 
firms in our sample. This gives 209 young companies and 209 older ones. The classification is 
conceptually similar to FHP’s retention categories because young firms are likely to be those 
more recently recognized by the financial markets. The results indicate that Q is significant for 
the “old” (i.e., more established) firms both before and after the crisis, whether or not I include 
sales in the specification. For younger firms, Q is not a significant determinant of investment in 
the pre-crisis period but is significant afterwards. Interestingly, the cash position of an older firm, 
which is significant in equation 2 and 3 before the crisis, is not significant after the crisis. Even 
the level of sales does not have a significant impact on investment for the older firms after the 
crisis. For younger firms, there is a statistically significant relationship between cash balances 
and/or sales and investment in both periods. 
The rising importance of Q for the younger firms in the post-crisis equations may reflect 
greater risks associated with doing business in Korea after 1997, and a reluctance to implement 
ideas whose quality was not already implicitly reflected in a firm’s market price. In other words, 
the quality of the business plan, rather than the amount of excess cash, became the prime mover 
for investment. This seems reasonable since many of younger, less established Korean firms had 
been targets of stimulatory government programs before the crisis, but were targeted less 
afterwards. For the older firms, where the coefficient on Q was significant in both sub-periods, 
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Table 3 
Investment GMM regressions by median age 
 Young  Old 
Equation 
No. (2) (3) (4) 
 (2) (3) (4) 
 Pre-crisis period (1992-1996) 
I/Kt-1 0.043* 0.047** 0.031  0.105** 0.104** 0.112** 
 (0.025) (0.023) (0.023)  (0.048) (0.049) (0.051) 
Q 0.035 0.068 -0.093  1.009** 0.998** 0.895** 
 (0.196) (0.154) (0.159)  (0.327) (0.319) (0.294) 
C/K 0.285** 0.640** 0.072  0.690** 0.757** 0.130 
 (0.128) (0.256) (0.111)  (0.172) (0.304) (0.354) 
CF/K  0.485*    0.081  
  (0.251)    (0.316)  
S/K   0.287**    0.192** 
   (0.102)    (0.026) 
Hansen 0.820 0.962 0.824  0.602 0.597 0.363 
N 364 364 364  399 399 399 
  
 Post-crisis period (1997-2001) 
I/Kt-1 0.093** 0.094** 0.082*  0.053 0.050 0.050 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.045)  (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
Q 0.074** 0.074** 0.055**  0.465** 0.423** 0.376** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.024)  (0.118) (0.113) (0.120) 
C/K 0.138** 0.128** 0.084*  0.097 0.176 0.156 
 (0.060) (0.059) (0.049)  (0.087) (0.146) (0.123) 
CF/K  -0.030    0.134  
  (0.044)    (0.103)  
S/K   0.087**    0.031 
   (0.018)    (0.026) 
Hansen 0.054 0.065 0.229  0.899 0.898 0.860 
N 1,042 1,042 1,042  1,028 1,028 1,028 
 
See notes for Table 1. 
 
 
I note that past investment decisions, as reflected in the lag of the investment rate, became a less 
important determinant of current investment after the crisis. It therefore appears that pure 
“inertia” was becoming no longer a reason for more established firms to withhold dividends from 
their shareholders.  
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To check the robustness of the regressions to the split of the sample at the median firm 
age, I repeated them using the youngest 25 percent and counting the remaining 75 percent among 
the old. Table 4 shows that the coefficient estimates are similar to those obtained with the split 
 
Table 4 
Investment GMM regressions by quartile age 
 Youngest 25%  Oldest 75% 
Equation 
No. (2) (3) (4) 
 (2) (3) (4) 
 Pre-crisis period (1992-1996) 
I/Kt-1 0.212** 0.160** 0.185**  0.013 0.032 0.022 
 (0.087) (0.071) (0.065)  (0.034) (0.026) (0.030) 
Q 0.046 0.058 -0.039  0.556** 0.525** 0.412* 
 (0.117) (0.094) (0.057)  (0.260) (0.240) (0.224) 
C/K 0.266* 0.466** 0.115  0.511** 0.913** 0.105 
 (0.140) (0.088) (0.130)  (0.139) (0.345) (0.195) 
CF/K  0.241**    0.552  
  (0.031)    (0.356)  
S/K   0.165**    0.225** 
   (0.048)    (0.059) 
Hansen 0.143 0.063 0.053  0.074 0.125 0.068 
N 155 155 155  608 608 608 
  
 Post-crisis period (1997-2001) 
I/Kt-1 0.112* 0.111* 0.096  0.038 0.038 0.041 
 (0.064) (0.065) (0.065)  (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
Q 0.114** 0.117** 0.080*  0.156** 0.147** 0.127** 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.043)  (0.071) (0.067) (0.059) 
C/K 0.285** 0.315** 0.243**  0.085 0.128* 0.135** 
 (0.112) (0.119) (0.100)  (0.059) (0.071) (0.066) 
CF/K  0.041    0.085**  
  (0.071)    (0.042)  
S/K   0.069**    0.039 
   (0.019)    (0.027) 
Hansen 0.707 0.715 0.683  0.294 0.266 0.261 
N 520 520 520  1,550 1,550 1,550 
 
See notes for Table 1. 
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at the median. For example, Q is a significant determinant of investment for young firms in the 
post-crisis period only, just as before, and cash becomes no longer statistically significant for the 
older firms. The main differences are that lagged investment is more important for the young 
firms in the pre-crisis period and the coefficient on cash balances is larger in the post-crisis 
period for the 25 percent sample than when the split occurs at the median. The latter result 
suggests that problems of asymmetric information and financing constraints became even more 
severe after the crisis for the very youngest firms in the sample. Indeed, the elasticity of 
investment with respect to cash balances (evaluated at the sample means of I/K and C/K) in the 
post-crisis period was 0.71 for the youngest 25 percent and 0.23 for the youngest 50 percent.  
Comparing the results in Table 3 and 4 with those in Table 2, it appears that stratifying 
the sample by firm age uncovers potentially important differences in the determinants of 
investment that were masked in the pooled analysis, particularly an increased role for Q along 
with cash balance among younger firms after the crisis. 
 
4.3. Investment by size 
The standard asymmetric information framework suggests that classifying firms by size 
could also be an appropriate way to evaluate the role of possible cash constraints on investment 
(see, for example, Blinder’s (1988) comment on FHP).  In practice, this is not easy to implement 
as sharply as one might like in the sample of exchange-listed Korean manufacturing firms. It is 
because most of the truly “small” firms in Korea are not listed on the organized exchange, and 
any data available for them are likely to be less reliable than data for larger firms. This means 
that the smallest enterprise in the sample is still quite large relative to most unlisted ones.  If size 
is indeed related to independent financial strength, however, one should still expect to see 
investment affected by it. 
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Table 5 
Investment GMM regressions by size (based on median total assets) 
 Small  Large 
Equation 
No. (2) (3) (4) 
 (2) (3) (4) 
 Pre-crisis period (1992-1996) 
I/Kt-1 0.031 0.033 0.032  0.114** 0.116** 0.091* 
 (0.029) (0.026) (0.027)  (0.052) (0.051) (0.053) 
Q 0.165 0.180 0.026  0.973** 0.954** 0.736** 
 (0.199) (0.166) (0.167)  (0.311) (0.305) (0.266) 
C/K 0.266** 0.823** 0.024  0.791** 0.847** 0.296 
 (0.125) (0.338) (0.114)  (0.163) (0.179) (0.303) 
CF/K  0.680**    0.084  
  (0.322)    (0.124)  
S/K   0.326**    0.170** 
   (0.097)    (0.021) 
Hansen 0.767 0.943 0.621  0.398 0.422 0.526 
N 368 368 368  395 395 395 
  
 Post-crisis period (1997-2001) 
I/Kt-1 0.029 0.027 0.028  0.084* 0.089** 0.092** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.026)  (0.044) (0.043) (0.043) 
Q 0.081** 0.078** 0.064**  0.469** 0.450** 0.267* 
 (0.036) (0.035) (0.031)  (0.126) (0.124) (0.137) 
C/K 0.085 0.104* 0.123**  0.499** 0.987** 0.265 
 (0.056) (0.057) (0.061)  (0.206) (0.270) (0.214) 
CF/K  0.036    0.580**  
  (0.029)    (0.191)  
S/K   0.029    0.163** 
   (0.019)    (0.053) 
Hansen 0.402 0.443 0.429  0.138 0.098 0.030 
N 1,034 1,034 1,034  1,036 1,036 1,036 
 
See notes for Table 1. 
 
  
To examine this possibility, Table 5 reports the same regressions as in Tables 3 and 4, but 
with firms classified this time into two groups based on their total assets. I do this by computing 
the mean of a company’s total real assets over the 10-year period of this study, and then using 
the cross sectional median of these means to define 209 smaller firms and 209 larger ones. The 
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evidence of Q becoming more important factor is not quite as strong as I found when classifying 
firms by age, yet the coefficients on Q are once again statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level for both groups after the financial crisis and not significant for smaller firms before the 
crisis. Further, cash balances seem to matter for smaller firms in the post-crisis period, while 
sales dominated before the crisis began. 
In this particular classification, I conclude that the existing data are consistent with one of 
the main hypotheses, namely that financial resources migrated after the 1997 crisis to firms 
whose quality was better known to investors. In other words, cash and other balance sheet 
quantities mattered less as lenders now pay more attention to the quality. However, there is weak 
evidence that relatively smaller firms suffered from binding internal cash holding. 
 
4.4. Investment by Chaebol affiliation 
In this part, I consider whether the financial crisis affected the availability of funds for 
firms affiliated with large industrial conglomerates (i.e., chaebols). As noted earlier, chaebol 
firms are members of well-established and presumably well-diversified business groups, and as 
such one might have expected the crisis, with of course a few important exceptions, to affect 
them less severely, and perhaps to have even moderated some of our earlier results with pooled 
samples of older and larger firms. To test this, I divided the sample into chaebol and non-chaebol 
firms and ran our earlier regressions once again with the new sub-samples.16    
Table 6, which reports the findings, shows that previous investment is a statistically 
significant determinant of current investment for chaebol firms, both before and after the crisis, 
                                                 
16 After splitting the sample, I found that 75 companies had chaebol affiliations before the crisis and 52 
after, while only 45 companies remained chaebol-affiliated over the full 1992-2001 sample period. The 
decline seems mainly due to the bankruptcies of several of these companies around the time of the crisis. 
(e.g., Kia, Hanra, Hanbo and New-Core in 1997; Jinro, Hanil and Geopyung in 1998; Daewoo, Hae-Tae 
and Shinho in 1999). 
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Table 6 
Investment GMM regressions by affiliation 
 Chaebol-affiliated  Not affiliated 
Equation 
No. (2) (3) (4) 
 (2) (3) (4) 
 Pre-crisis period (1992-1996) 
I/Kt-1 0.254** 0.271** 0.192**  0.034 0.037 0.036 
 (0.070) (0.094) (0.081)  (0.033) (0.028) (0.029) 
Q 2.038** 1.972** 1.625**  0.229 0.217 0.105 
 (0.539) (0.420) (0.479)  (0.177) (0.162) (0.151) 
C/K 1.164** 1.913** 0.382  0.389** 0.696** 0.082 
 (0.444) (0.390) (0.324)  (0.130) (0.227) (0.139) 
CF/K  1.070**    0.402*  
  (0.297)    (0.223)  
S/K   0.319**    0.214** 
   (0.067)    (0.052) 
Hansen 0.527 0.696 0.334  0.180 0.443 0.442 
N 148 148 148  615 615 615 
  
 Post-crisis period (1997-2001) 
I/Kt-1 0.129** 0.143** 0.201**  0.043 0.041 0.042 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.061)  (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) 
Q 0.371 0.349 -0.041  0.132** 0.128** 0.105** 
 (0.237) (0.241) (0.204)  (0.049) (0.048) (0.041) 
C/K 1.808** 2.167** 1.196**  0.096 0.132* 0.139** 
 (0.632) (0.695) (0.599)  (0.060) (0.068) (0.059) 
CF/K  0.421**    0.067**  
  (0.204)    (0.034)  
S/K   0.600**    0.039 
   (0.069)    (0.024) 
Hansen 0.207 0.235 0.114  0.450 0.408 0.438 
N 260 260 260  1,810 1,810 1,810 
 
See notes for Table 1. 
 
while it is never significant for non-chaebol firms. This is probably due to the chaebol’s 
continued control over many of Korea’s heavy industries, which are more capital intensive and 
require more persistent investment than light-industry firms that comprise a large part of the non-
chaebol category.  In comparing the panels in the upper and lower left of the table, I also find 
 22
that the effect of cash balances on the investment of chaebol firms is much stronger in the post-
crisis regime than before the crisis, while the coefficient on Q becomes smaller and no longer 
statistically significant after the crisis.  
These results are quite the opposite of those found when I compared older firms with 
younger ones in Tables 3 through 5, and present something of a puzzle since most chaebol firms 
would generally be among the larger listed firms in Korea. Further, the coefficient on cash 
balances for chaebol firms after the crisis (with an elasticity with respect to investment of 0.704 
when measured at the sample mean of C/K) is much larger than that of non-chaebol firms (with 
an elasticity of 0.302).  This is again the opposite of what I found when comparing older and 
younger firms. All of this suggests that chaebol firms faced a different financial environment in 
the post-crisis period than a typical well-established Korean firm.  
Why, then, did the crisis affect the chaebol affiliates more emphatically than non-chaebol 
firms in terms of tightening cash constraints, and why did their investment decisions become 
increasingly dependent on the level of internal funds? One explanation, supported in earlier work 
by Borensztein and Lee (2002) and Laeven (2002), suggests that chaebol-affiliated firms lost 
their preferential access to external financing after the financial crisis. 
 
5. Robustness of classification: Do chaebols dominate the results? 
 The main findings from estimation of the investment equations in Section 4 is that 
Tobin’s Q is a significant determinant of investment in the post-crisis period for all categories of 
firms in our sample, whereas it was not for younger, smaller, and non-chaebol firms before the 
crisis. One possible explanation is that firms placed more weight after the crisis on potential 
profitability when considering new investments rather than simply responding to indicators of  
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Table 7 
Investment GMM regressions by median age excluding chaebols 
 Young Non-chaebols  Old Non-chaebols 
Equation 
No. (2) (3) (4)  (2) (3) (4) 
 Pre-crisis period (1992-1996) 
I/Kt-1 0.044* 0.045** 0.035  0.083 0.083 0.097 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.021)  (0.051) (0.052) (0.061) 
Q -0.062 -0.016 -0.181  0.854** 0.855** 0.754** 
 (0.191) (0.142) (0.154)  (0.352) (0.344) (0.312) 
C/K 0.288** 0.621** 0.078  0.625** 0.622** 0.077 
 (0.129) (0.258) (0.111)  (0.178) (0.312) (0.398) 
CF/K  0.464*    -0.004  
  (0.255)    (0.355)  
S/K   0.280**    0.184** 
   (0.110)    (0.025) 
Hansen 0.801 0.934 0.988  0.751 0.751 0.670 
N 320 320 320  295 295 295 
  
 Post-crisis period (1997-2001) 
I/Kt-1 0.080 0.081 0.064  0.047 0.043 0.044 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.055)  (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
Q 0.069** 0.070** 0.052**  0.454** 0.411** 0.372** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.023)  (0.129) (0.123) (0.129) 
C/K 0.128** 0.119** 0.076  0.087 0.163 0.139 
 (0.056) (0.055) (0.047)  (0.080) (0.135) (0.111) 
CF/K  -0.028    0.128  
  (0.042)    (0.099)  
S/K   0.081**    0.027 
   (0.017)    (0.022) 
Hansen 0.113 0.124 0.405  0.951 0.948 0.923 
N 967 967 967  843 843 843 
 
See notes for Table 1. 
 
 
past performance such as sales. The lending sector may also have considered future profitability 
more carefully in making resource allocations after the crisis, rather than relying on traditional 
measures of repayment ability such as reputation, size or chaebol affiliation. Indeed, lenders may 
have found the risk and return characteristics of older, larger, and chaebol firms to be less 
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desirable after the crisis than before, and found the tradeoff for younger and smaller firms 
comparatively more attractive. 
 
Table 8 
Investment GMM regressions by size excluding chaebols 
 Small Non-chaebols  Large Non-chaebols 
Equation 
No. (2) (3) (4) 
 (2) (3) (4) 
 Pre-crisis period (1992-1996) 
I/Kt-1 0.031 0.033 0.030  0.066 0.069 0.058 
 (0.025) (0.023) (0.023)  (0.087) (0.086) (0.091) 
Q 0.070 0.092 -0.058  0.773** 0.721** 0.524* 
 (0.187) (0.149) (0.144)  (0.316) (0.316) (0.279) 
C/K 0.255** 0.817** 0.011  0.710** 0.719** 0.281 
 (0.124) (0.348) (0.113)  (0.172) (0.196) (0.322) 
CF/K  0.680**    0.012  
  (0.328)    (0.128)  
S/K   0.336**    0.149** 
   (0.099)    (0.020) 
Hansen 0.851 0.995 0.875  0.176 0.205 0.395 
N 346 346 346  269 269 269 
  
 Post-crisis period (1997-2001) 
I/Kt-1 0.025 0.024 0.024  0.071 0.073 0.073 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.026)  (0.053) (0.052) (0.051) 
Q 0.082** 0.079** 0.064**  0.432** 0.416** 0.262* 
 (0.036) (0.035) (0.031)  (0.133) (0.133) (0.141) 
C/K 0.084 0.103* 0.123**  0.375** 0.870** 0.179 
 (0.055) (0.056) (0.061)  (0.185) (0.281) (0.194) 
CF/K  0.036    0.591**  
  (0.029)    (0.224)  
S/K   0.029    0.131** 
   (0.019)    (0.042) 
Hansen 0.552 0.594 0.578  0.080 0.048 0.029 
N 1,019 1,019 1,019  791 791 791 
 
See notes for Table 1. 
 
 
One may be suspicious if the results from the age and/or size classifications are driven by 
chaebols as the chaebols-affiliated firms which are, in general, older and/or larger. Since the 
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financing behavior of chaebol firms seems to differ from typical older or larger non-chaebol 
firms in the sample, I first check the sensitivity of the regression results in Tables 3-5 by running 
the GMM equations excluding chaebol-affiliated firms from the sample. Table 7 reports the 
results from the smaller sub-sample of non-chaebol old and young firms. The concern was that 
chaebol firms were among oldest and might have influenced our results for older firms. 
Interestingly, the results in Table 7 remain quite similar to those in Table 3. 
Then, I repeated the regressions in Table 7 for small and large non-chaebol firms as well, 
and found that eliminating the chaebol-affiliated firms gave qualitatively similar results to Table 
5 as introduced in Table 8. Although, the previous investment becomes now a statistically 
insignificant determinant of current investment for larger firms especially in the pre-crisis period, 
it is probably due to the fact that about 90 percent of chaebol affiliates are classified as the large 
companies in the sample.  As noted earlier, chaebols operate in heavy industries, which require 
more persistent investment. 
The evidence from the experiment of excluding chaebols, described in Table 7 and 8, 
suggests that the previous estimations (in Table 3 and 5) were neither sensitive to nor driven by 
the potentially influential chaebol-affiliated firms in the sample. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this study, I examine the role of Tobin’s Q, cash balances and sales on the investment 
decisions of Korean manufacturing firms in the five years before and after the East Asian 
financial crisis of late 1997.  To investigate the issue of heterogeneity embedded in a financing 
hierarchy or “pecking order” theory of investment, three different classifications are defined, by 
age, size, and affiliation to a chaebol.  To address econometric issues such as endogeneity and 
the serial correlation of errors in our dynamic panel models, GMM estimation was used. 
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I find that the standard Q-theory of investment explains firm-level decisions well when I 
pool data for all firms listed on the Korean Stock Exchange, and that this result for the most 
survives when the pre- and post-crisis periods are considered separately. Allowing for firm 
heterogeneity before and after the financial crisis, however, I find that the investment of younger 
and/or smaller firms did not depend on Q before the crisis but that Q became an important 
determinant afterwards. The opposite occurred among chaebol-affiliated firms. 
I also find that the cash variables, which are proxing for financing constraints, affect 
firms’ investment decisions significantly after the crisis.  The financial constraint appears to be 
more binding in the younger and/ or smaller firms after controlling for Q and sales variables.  
This result is also consistent with the pecking order theory.  Moreover, the estimated effects in 
this study probably underestimate the extent of problems of asymmetric information and 
financing constraints in the Korean economy because the sample contains only those companies 
listed on the formal stock exchange. In addition, the level of internal cash balances became much 
more important for the investment of chaebol firms after the crisis, suggesting that chaebols lost 
some of their earlier preferential access to credit. 
These findings could reflect an increased importance of the future profitability in the 
lending decisions of Korean and international financial institutions in the post-crisis regime. By 
this I mean that resource allocation decisions became more market-oriented after the financial 
crisis and less dependent on imperfections in the capital markets. This is not to say that such 
imperfections are now unimportant, but rather that the financial crisis was a defining event in 
Korea’s postwar history – a time when its capital markets matured significantly and prices 
therein became more informative about the underlying quality of business plans. 
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One of the findings in this empirical study implies that the Korean government may need 
to re-examine its regulation on chaebol-affiliated companies because they now seem to face 
financing constraints and no longer have an advantage in financing business projects. Another 
implication that can be drawn from this study involves the effectiveness of the IMF program that 
followed the crisis. The main purposes of the program were to reform the corporate and financial 
sectors and to eliminate economic inefficiencies by reducing a number of interventions and 
regulations. At the same time, the government imposed and emphasized new regulations to 
revive and maintain well-functioning financial intermediation. Table A1 in the Appendix 
summarizes the changes in firms’ financing decisions that followed the shift to the post-crisis 
regime. They tried to reduce their debt levels in both the short and long-term, with the ratio of 
debt to equity falling sharply as I mentioned earlier. Along with the estimation results from this 
study, it seems that the IMF program has been successful. Of course, now may not be the best 
time to evaluate the performance of the IMF program, at least for the manufacturing sector, 
because structural reforms in an economy often occur quite slowly. Nevertheless, the evidence 
suggests that the IMF program along with the Korean government policy reaction to the crisis 
led the economy towards a more market-oriented financial environment than before. 
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Appendix A 
 
 
Table A1 
Financial Structure of the Listed Companies in the Manufacturing Sector 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Liabilities (% of total assets) 76.7 68.7 57.4 57.1 54.4 
Short-term Borrowing (% of total assets) 18.2 13.2 7.2 8.9 7.7 
Long-term Borrowing  (% of total assets) 14.7 9.9 7.3 6.1 5.5 
Equity Capital (% of total assets) 23.3 31.3 42.6 42.9 45.6 
Debt-to-Equity Ratio 3.29 2.20 1.35 1.33 1.19 
Net Income (% of equity capital) -0.7 2.5 11.2 6.8 1.7 
Growth rate of real tangible assets (%) 21.6 1.7 0.6 -2.1 -8.0 
Number of Firms 455 408 423 424 439 
Source: Korea Listed Companies Association, “Annual Report of KSE Companies (CD-ROM)”, 2002.  Some listed 
companies are excluded if they 1) did not report, 2) changed their types of business, 3) were disqualified by a public 
auditor, or 4) had impaired capital. 
 
 
 
 
Table A2 
Cross Tabulation by Firm Classifications 
 Small Large Young firms Old firms Chaebol Non- chaebol 
Small     
Large 
N.A. 
    
Young Firms 139 70   
Old Firms 70 139 
N.A. 
  
Chaebol 7 56.5 19 44.5 
Non-chaebol 202 152.5 190 164.5 
N.A. 
Number of Firms 209 209 209 209 63.5 354.5 
Note: From the sample of 418 manufacturing firms listed on the Korean Stock Exchange. An “N.A.” in the diagonal 
elements indicates not applicable self-pointing cases for the cross tabulation. The chaebol classification can change 
over time. In other words, a firm that belonged to a chaebol before the crisis may not be classified as a chaebol-
affiliate in the post-crisis period.  There are two possible cases. The chaebol itself may be dropped out of the official 
FTC list or the firm may have ended its affiliation with the chaebol. 
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Appendix B 
 
 
K: Capital stock at the beginning of the year measured by properties and equipments 
including land and others.   i.e. fixed capital which includes buildings and structures, 
machinery and equipments, instruments and tools, and land. 
 
I: Investment during the year 
 K at the end of year – K at the beginning of year 
 
CF: Cash flow during the year 
 Cash at the end of year – Cash at the beginning of year 
 
C: Stock of cash at the beginning of year 
 
Q: Market value / Book value 
 Market value = market value of common stock + Short-term and Long-term liabilities 
  where, market value of common stock = price * number of outstanding shares 
 Book value = book value of common stock + Short term liabilities + Long term liabilities 
  where, book value of common stock = Shareholders’ equity – Intangible assets 
 
S: Sales amount during the year (NS) 
 
Dummy Variables 
dcpa = 1 if the financial statements are qualified by CPA; 0 otherwise 
difa = 1 if the firm is under issues for administration; 0 otherwise 
dchg = 1 if the firm has been changed the reporting period; 0 otherwise 
dloss = 1 if the firm records net loss after tax in the year; 0 otherwise 
dcf = 1 if the firm has negative cash flow in the year; 0 otherwise 
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